This article surveys work in epistemology since the mid-1980s. It focuses on (i) contextualism about knowledge attributions, (ii) modest forms of foundationalism, and (iii) the internalism/externalism debate and its connections to the ethics of belief.
center stage. We can group those issues under three headings, too, corresponding to the three developments cited above: (i) contextualist theories of knowledge came on the scene and are now starting to be widely discussed; (ii) modest forms of foundationalism have become more familiar, and are now widely believed to be viable; and (iii) epistemologists have begun more vigorously to explore issues in the ethics of belief, and their connection to the internalism/externalism debate. I will discuss each of these in turn, and will devote the most attention to issue (iii).
I should note one important omission: I will say little about`naturalized epistemology' in this survey, though that has received a good deal of attention in recent years. In part, this is because it is hard to ®nd a single set of theses one can claim to be de®nitive of naturalism. But largely it is because of space constraints. Since naturalism has been well-surveyed elsewhere (see Mae [1990b] ; Kitcher [1992] ; Goldman [1994] ; and Kornblith [1995] ), I thought it would be better to concentrate on the issues I do take up below. 
Contextualism and relevant alternatives theories
We'll understand Contextualism to be the doctrine that the truth of a knowledge-ascription can vary with the context in which that ascription is made or assessed. For example, according to the Contextualist, the sentencè Reagan knew that the Iran/Contra dealings were taking place' might express a hard-earned truth when uttered in a history classroom, yet express something false when uttered in a discussion of skepticism. ordinary epistemic evaluations. The Contextualist can allow that both of these standards are legitimate, in their proper context. (And the Contextualist is not limited to just two kinds of standards: there may be many dierent standards, appropriate to dierent contexts.)
Another early root of Contextualism was the discussion of Gettier-cases where evidence one does not possessÐe.g. a newspaper headline one hasn't read yetÐseems to defeat one's claims to knowledge (see Harman [1968] , [1973] , Ch. 9, [1980] ). 4 It is very natural to think that the extent to which this kind of evidence aects one's epistemic standing will vary with context. Suppose your friend in the White House tells you that the President is in Mexico, and suppose you truly believe on that basis that the President is in Mexico. But suppose also that, unbeknownst to you, the Washington Post has just printed a (false) story that claims that the President is not in Mexico but rather vacationing in Maine. In some contexts we might want to count your justi®ed true belief as knowledge despite the existence of the misleading newspaper report. In other contexts, though, we'd take the fact that the newspaper report is widely disseminated to preclude your belief about the President's whereabouts from counting as knowledge. The Contextualist can make sense of these shifts.
A third root of Contextualism is the Relevant Alternatives Theory of knowledge put forward in the 1970s by Dretske ([1970] , [1981] ) and Goldman ([1976] ). We should discuss this at length.
As we'll understand the RA-Theory, it says that, if q is an irrelevant alternative to p, then knowing p doesn't require you to have evidence which would enable you to rule q out; in fact, so long as q is irrelevant, you don't need to have any independent evidence against q. For example, if you see a zebra in a zoo pen, and the possibility that the animal you see is a cleverly disguised mule is an irrelevant alternative, then you would not need to have evidence against that alternative, in order to know that the animal is a zebra.
This RA-Theory combines naturally with Contextualism. The combined view says that what alternatives count as relevant is a function of the context in which the knowledge ascription is made or assessed (see Stine [1976] ; DeRose [1992] , [1995] ; and Lewis [1996] ). Now, early proponents of the RA-Theory, like Dretske, denied that knowledge is closed under known logical consequence. But contemporary Contextualist proponents of RA-Theory argue that we should retain some kind of Closure Principle. Let q be some alternative you cannot rule out. Their idea is that, in a given context where q is irrelevant, then if you know p and you know that p implies not-q, you count as knowing not-q, too. Some contextualists say that when we explicitly raise the question whether you know not-q, that makes q relevant, and hence, since you can't rule q out, you don't count as knowing not-q, and you don't count as knowing p either. But as they see it, there is no single context in which you both know p and fail to know not-q. In contexts where q is relevant, you count as knowing neither. In contexts where q is irrelevant, you count as knowing both.
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Although RA-Theory is nowadays often combined with Contextualism, it is important to recognize that these two theories don't have to be combined. Some RA-Theorists believe that what alternatives are relevant is wholly determined by facts about the putative knower and his environment (perhaps including facts about his epistemic community). It does not vary from one context of knowledge-ascription to another. That is a form of RA-Theory without Contextualism. 6 One can also hold Contextualism without RA-Theory. This is the best way to understand Cohen ([1998 Cohen ([ ], [1999 ). Let's call this view Strength-of-Evidence Contextualism. (Vogel [1999] calls it`Plain Contextualism'.) The Strength-ofEvidence Contextualist thinks that what you count as knowing varies from context to context, but he denies that you can ever, in any context, know a proposition while having no evidence against alternatives to that proposition. Facts about the context in which we're ascribing knowledge to a subject never excuse the subject from the requirement to have some evidence against alternatives to what he believes. For instance, the Strength-of-Evidence Contextualist says that until you have at least some evidence against the possibility that the animal you see is a cleverly disguised mule, you can't know that animal to be a zebraÐeven if the possibility that the animal is a cleverly disguised mule is an irrelevant alternative. What context does aect is how strong your evidence has to be, what newspapers you have to take into account, what defeating evidence you need to appreciate the force of, and so on. In some contexts, you can know that the animal you see is a zebra, while having only very slender evidence against the possibility that it's a cleverly disguised mule; in other contexts, you need a lot more evidence. By the same lights, the Strength-of-Evidence Contextualist says that in order to count as knowing anything about the external world on the basis of perception, you'd need to have at least some reasons for rejecting hypotheses about brains in vats and the 98 James Pryor 5 Stine ([1976] ); Cohen ([1988] ); DeRose ([1995] ); and Lewis ([1996] ) all argue for Contextualist views which retain some form of Closure. Heller ([1999b] ) defends Dretske's rejection of Closure. For further discussion of the relations between Contextualism and Closure, see Vogel ([1990] ). 6 This appears to be Dretske's view ([1991] ). It is also formulated by Goldman ([1976] ), though
Goldman doesn't endorse the view. He prefers a Contextualist version of RA-Theory. On the dierence between RA-Theory with Contextualism and RA-Theory without Contextualism, see Cohen ([1991] ) and DeRose ([1992] , [1999] Vogel [1999] , section 3 for discussion.) Comparatively little attention has been paid to how we manage to eliminate or rule out an alternative. So let's say a few words about this issue. On Dretske's account, ruling q out is just a matter of knowing not-q. However, this account of ruling out would not suit those RA-Theorists who wish to retain Closure. For suppose that q is some alternative you can't rule out. According to the RA-Theorist, you can sometimes know p despite being unable to rule q outÐso long as q is irrelevant. If q were to become relevant, then your inability to rule it out would prevent you from knowing p. Now, if we retain some form of Closure, then in those contexts in which you count as knowing p you'd also, by Closure, count as able to know not-q. This despite the fact that you're not able to rule q out. So if we retain Closure, we should understand ruling an alternative out as requiring more than just knowing that alternative to be false.
A better account might be an evidential account of ruling out. We could say that ruling q out requires you to have independent evidence against q, evidence which does not beg any of the questions for which q is an alternative.
8 An RA-Theorist who adopts this account of`ruling out' can say that, when the possibility that you are a brain in a vat is irrelevant, you can know by perception that you have hands, and hence by Closure also know that you're not a handless brain in a vat. But you're not in a position to rule out the possibility that you are a brain in a vat, because you have no independent evidence against that possibility. Whatever justi®cation you have for believing that you're not a brain in a vat crucially rests on things you purport to know about the external world by perception. It's for this reason that when the possibility that you are a brain in a vat becomes relevant, you no longer count as knowing you have hands.
A dierent account construes ruling out in counterfactual terms. According to this account, you rule an alternative out by having your belief be counterfactually sensitive to whether that alternative obtains. For example, when it's your knowledge of p that is in question, such an account could say that being able to rule q out is a matter of being such that, if q were true, you would no longer believe p.
9
The accounts of ruling out mentioned so far attempt to be explanatory in a certain way. They appeal to some independent facts about your relation to your evidence in order to explain facts about what that evidence enables you to know. An alternative way to proceed would be to take as given the facts about what your evidence would enable you to know in certain contexts, and use those facts to explain the notions of`being relevant' and`ruling out'. This is Cohen's initial approach; he de®nes an alternative to p as`relevant' just in case it has to be ruled out in order for you to know p ([1988] , pp. 100±1). However, Cohen then goes on to discuss more substantial criteria for being relevant'. A similar view would say that you're in a position to rule some alternative to p out just in case you'd be able to know p even if that alternative were relevant. These construals of`relevant' and`ruling out' are perfectly legitimate, as far as they go. They just won't be very useful for giving explanations of what we know when. They take the facts about what we know when for granted, and ride piggy-back on them.
Though this issue of how to understand the notion of`ruling out' needs more attention, Contextualism is currently a very active research program, and it has rapidly become one of the most seriously regarded responses to skepticism.
Modest forms of foundationalism
Another active source of resistance to skepticism comes from new foundationalist accounts of perceptual justi®cation. Foundationalism's prospects quite generally look much better today than they did twenty-®ve years ago. In this section, we'll take a brief look at this development.
Say that you are`immediately justi®ed' in believing p i you're justi®ed in believing p, and this justi®cation doesn't rest on justi®cation you have for believing other supporting propositions. According to the foundationalist, the justi®cation for all our beliefs ultimately traces back to a set of`basic beliefs', which we have immediate justi®cation for believing.
Traditionally, foundationalists thought that these basic beliefs could only concern the nature of one's current thoughts and experiences. (And perhaps some a priori matters as well.) All our other empirical beliefs, including beliefs about our perceptual environment, had to rest inferentially on this austere foundation of beliefs about our current mental states. These basic beliefs were thought to be exceptionally secure. They were often claimed to be infallible and indubitable. According to many foundationalists, the reason why these beliefs were so secure was that we had a non-propositional`direct apprehension' of the mental states the beliefs were about.
There are many reasons to be unhappy with that traditional cluster of views. It's generally felt that a foundation consisting only of infallible beliefs about our own mental states would be too austere to support the rest of our empirical beliefs. And many philosophers also criticized the traditional foundationalists' views about`direct apprehension'.
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In addition, BonJour put forward an in¯uential argument which seemed to show that, at least on internalist conceptions of justi®cation, it was impossible for there to be any basic beliefs. BonJour defended an account of justi®cation according to which, to be justi®ed in believing a proposition p, you have to be justi®ed in believing that your belief has some features which make it likely to be true. This account makes it impossible for your belief in p ever to be immediately justi®ed. Your justi®cation for your belief in p would always rest in part on your justi®cation for those further beliefs about the belief's features.
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10 See the anti-Given arguments in Sellars ([1956] ); Davidson ([1981] ); BonJour ([1978] , [1985] ); and Williams ([1999a] ). BonJour has changed his mind about these arguments; see below. These anti-Given arguments deserve a re-examination, in light of recent developments in the philosophy of mind. The anti-Given arguments pose a dilemma: either (i) direct apprehension is not a state with propositional content, in which case it's argued to be incapable of providing us with justi®cation for believing any speci®c proposition; or (ii) direct apprehension is a state with propositional content. This second option is often thought to entail that direct apprehension is a kind of believing, and hence itself would need justi®cation. But it ought nowadays to be very doubtful that the second option does entail such things. These days many philosophers of mind construe perceptual experience as a state with propositional content, even though experience is distinct from, and cannot be reduced to, any kind of belief. Your experiences represent the world to you as being a certain way, and the way they represent the world as being is their propositional content. Now, surely, it's looking to you as if the world is a certain way is not a kind of state for which you need any justi®cation. Hence, this construal of perceptual experience seems to block the step from`has propositional content' to`needs justi®cation'. Of course, what are`apprehended' by perceptual experiences are facts about your perceptual environment, rather than facts about your current mental states. But it should at least be clear that the second horn of the anti-Given argument needs more argument than we've seen so far. To be fair, most of the foundationalists who appealed to a notion of`direct apprehension' understood this notion along the lines of horn (i); and that is where their critics have focused most of their attention.
In recent years, though, foundationalism has staged quite a successful comeback.
12 There are two main reasons for this. In the ®rst place, foundationalists nowadays think that the implausible elements in traditional foundationalism are inessential extras that aren't required by the reasoning that primarily motivates foundationalism. Newer forms of foundationalism are quite`modest', in that they allow basic beliefs to be fallible, revisable, less than maximally justi®ed, and so on. They only require that these basic beliefs be immediately justi®edÐthat is, justi®ed in a way that doesn't rest on justi®cation one has for other, supporting propositions. Some of these new foundationalist views allow beliefs about our perceptual environment to qualify as basic. Some of them even grant important epistemic roles to facts about coherence: e.g. they may allow facts about coherence to defeat or to strengthen one's justi®cation for a belief, even a basic belief. These theories count as foundationalist because they say that, for every justi®ed belief a subject has, at least some of his justi®cation for that belief is immediate or ultimately rests on other justi®cation that is immediate. In addition, many philosophers have come to think that BonJour-style arguments against the possibility of basic beliefs are unsuccessful. The now-standard reply to BonJour's argument is that it builds into justi®ed beliefs about the world conditions which really ought only apply to our higher-level, re¯ective beliefs that our beliefs about the world are justi®ed. For you simply to have a justi®ed belief about the world, this reply says, that belief may need to have features that make it reasonable or likely to be true, but you need not, in addition, be justi®ed in believing it has such features. You can have a justi®ed belief`There is a hand', without also being justi®ed in believing`I am justi®ed in believing that there is a hand' or`I believe that there is a hand on grounds which make that belief likely to be true'. Acquiring justi®cation for the latter beliefs would be a further epistemological accomplishment. Once this move is made, it is hard for BonJour's argument to get going.
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A notable recent development is that BonJour, who was formerly a leading coherentist about empirical beliefs, has given up coherentism and now himself advocates a form of foundationalism (see BonJour [1999a BonJour [ ], [1999b Internalism in epistemology is a dierent sort of issue than internalism in philosophy of mind. Philosophers of mind are concerned with whether certain mental properties (e.g. the property of having a belief with such-andsuch content) supervene on one's intrinsic make-up. Epistemologists are more concerned with the connection between one's justi®catory status and facts to which one has a special kind of accessÐe.g. facts about what one believes, what experiences and memories one has, facts about what one's beliefs are based on (see below), what one's goals are, what one is attempting to do, and so on. Clearly, not every state that is`internal' in the philosophy of mind sense will be among these states. Sub-personal states of one's visual processing system are`internal' in the philosophy of mind sense, but they are not states to which we have any special ®rst-person access. In addition, it is a hotly debated question what sorts of special ®rst-person access we have to the`wide' contents of our thoughts (see the collections cited in fn. 2). So it is not obvious that every state which is`internal' in the epistemologist's sense will be`internal' in the philosophy of mind sense. Hence, it is certainly possible to combine externalism in philosophy of mind with internalism in epistemology, and vice versa.
What kind of`special access' is at play in the debate about internalism in epistemology? Dierent accounts of this are possible. One could understand this special access' in terms of the strength of one's access: one could understand it as meaning infallibility, say, or as meaning that non-culpable mistakes are impossible. Alternatively, one could understand this`special access' in terms of the route by which one has access: one could understand it as meaning that one can know by re¯ection alone whether one is in one of the relevant states. (Bỳ re¯ection' I mean a priori reasoning, introspective awareness of one's own mental states, and one's memory of knowledge acquired in those ways.) It would then be a further question whether one's re¯ective knowledge was infallible or especially certain in any remarkable way. Dierent choices about how to understand the notion of`special access' will aect one's understanding of the entire internalism/ externalism debate. Most epistemologists understand the notion in the last way I described, and I will follow them. Now, there are two dominant ways in which epistemologists understand the notion of`internalism'. One is in terms of a supervenience thesis. The other is in terms of whether the subject has special access to her epistemic condition. We'll start with the supervenience construal of`internalism'.
I will take the following supervenience thesis to express the most minimal internalist position:
Simple Internalism: Whether one is justi®ed in believing p supervenes on facts which one is in a position to know about by re¯ection alone.
I will take Externalism to be the denial of Simple Internalism. Now, sometimes when we're evaluating your epistemic standing, we're only interested in whether you have justi®cation for believing certain propositionsÐregardless of whether you actually do believe those propositions. Other times, though, we're interested in more than that. We want to know whether you do believe the propositions you have justi®cation for believing, and if so, whether your belief is based on that justi®cation. You may have very good reasons for believing p, but base your belief in p on bad reasons. In such cases, your belief is epistemically defective, even though it's a belief in a proposition you have justi®cation for believing. 16 The internalism/externalism debate bears on both of these kinds of epistemic evaluation. We can ask whether the facts that you're in a position to know about by re¯ection alone determine that you are justi®ed in believing some proposition. And we can also ask whether those facts determine that your belief is based on something that justi®es it. One normally sees externalist positions formulated in terms of the second kind of evaluation. For example, process reliabilism is usually formulated in terms of whether the process which led to 16 In such cases, we say that your belief is`ill-founded', though it's a belief in a proposition you have good reason to believe. See Feldman and Conee ([1985] ) on the contrast between`wellfounded' and`ill-founded' beliefs. A belief counts as well-founded i the subject has grounds that support the proposition he believes, his belief is based on those grounds, and the subject isn't ignoring any evidence he has which defeats those grounds. See also Audi's discussion of the contrast between`impersonal' and`personal' justi®cation, and the contrast between reasons one has for a belief and the reasons for which one holds a belief (in Audi [1993] , Chs 3, 7, and 8). Korcz ([1997] ) is a useful survey of literature on the basing relation. Sometimes one will in forming a belief base it on one ground, but then later come to base the belief on another ground. This later ground will then be what sustains one's continued acceptance of the belief. For our purposes we can ignore such complications.
one's actually forming a given belief is reliable. This makes it look like the debate between process reliabilists and their opponents solely concerns the evaluation of beliefs. But Goldman pointed out that the internalism/externalism debate can be conducted in terms of either sort of evaluation (see his discussion of ex post vs. ex ante justi®cation in Goldman [1979] ). The focus in these discussions on the reliability of our belief-forming processes is sometimes just an indirect way of raising questions about the reliability of certain sources of justi®cation, like our senses. Consider a community whose visual experiences are reliable guides to their environment, but who have a cognitive defect that leads to them never basing any beliefs on their visual experiences. One can imagine a reliabilist saying that these people's experiences give them justi®cation for believing certain things, even though they have no well-founded visual beliefs. That would be a reliabilist view about the evaluation of propositions, rather than the evaluation of actual beliefs.
Whichever sort of evaluation we focus on, we should be careful to distinguish Simple Internalism from the following, more demanding internalist position:
Access Internalism: One always has`special access' to one's justi®catory status.
A strong version of Access Internalism would say that whenever you're justi®ed in believing p, then you're justi®ed in believing that you are so justi®ed. This is akin to the`KK Principle', which says that whenever you know p, you also know that you know. (Nozick [1981] , p. 281 construes internalism' as the acceptance of such a KK Principle.) Weaker versions of Access Internalism are also possible. For instance, one might claim that whenever you're justi®ed in believing p, then the fact that you are so justi®ed is one you're in a position to acquire justi®cation for believing, by a certain route. This does not require that you actually already be justi®ed in believing those facts. Like Simple Internalism, Access Internalism can be formulated either as a view concerning the evaluation of propositions or as a view concerning the evaluation of beliefs.
17
Access Internalism' is now a somewhat-established name for the view(s) just described. However in some ways this nomenclature is unfortunate, for both Simple Internalism and Access Internalism have something to do with considerations of access. The Simple Internalist says that the accessible facts form a supervenience base for whether we're justi®ed; the Access Internalist says that whether we're justi®ed is itself an accessible fact. It is important to recognize that Simple Internalism does not by itself entail that stronger claim. Even if the fact that one is justi®ed is wholly determined by facts of which one is Highlights of Recent Epistemology re¯ectively aware, that does not guarantee that one can tell just by re¯ection that one is justi®ed. After all, one might be epistemologically untrained, or, worse, have false beliefs about what it takes to be justi®ed. There's no guarantee that one would be able to correct these defects by mere armchair re¯ection.
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The way I formulated Access Internalism, it imposes an access requirement on all of one's justi®cation. One might feel that this is too strong, especially for basic, unre¯ective kinds of justi®cation like we get in perception. Access Internalism seems to say that our perceptual beliefs are justi®ed only if we're justi®ed in believing that they are justi®ed. But whether and how our perceptual beliefs are justi®ed is a matter that epistemologists are constantly investigating. It seems harsh to say that no one's perceptual beliefs are justi®ed unless he has a justi®ed position on that matter. In light of this, some philosophers prefer to impose access requirements only on the kind of justi®cation we seek from inferences. Other philosophers require us to have access only to the presence of the stu that justi®es our beliefs (e.g. our experiences), and not to the fact that our beliefs are justi®ed by that stu. Let's look at these possibilities brie¯y.
Internalism about inferences and grounds
When you base a belief on some (genuine or alleged) body of supporting justi®cation, call that justi®cation your`grounds' for your belief. Dierent things might count as grounds. In some cases, you will believe p on the basis of other beliefs; these other beliefs are inferential grounds for your belief in p. When you base your belief in p on an inferential ground, say the belief q, it is widely agreed that your belief in p is justi®ed only when your belief in q is also justi®ed. But there is disagreement about what more is required for your belief in p to be justi®ed. (i) Do you need to have good reason to believe that your ground q constitutes good evidence for p? Or (ii) does q merely have to in fact be good evidence for p? Call someone who arms (i) an Inferential Internalist. An Inferential Externalist denies (i) and arms (ii) instead.
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Inferential Internalism is a kind of Access Internalism, limited just to one's inferential justi®cation. (It says nothing about what kind of access we have to our immediate justi®cation.) Denying Inferential Internalism does not force one also to deny Simple Internalism. Whether an Inferential Externalist accepts or rejects Simple Internalism will depend on what he thinks is required for q to be good evidence for p. The Simple Internalist will argue that whether q is good evidence for p is a necessary matter, or at least, that it's wholly determined by facts to which one has the relevant kind of`special access'; the externalist will argue that it depends on contingent facts about one's environment, to which one has no`special access'. These positions are both compatible with Inferential Externalism.
We've been discussing cases where your belief in p is based on other beliefs. In other cases, you will believe p but not on the basis of other beliefs; rather, your justi®cation for believing p will come from the fact that you have certain experiences or memories, or from the fact that you understand certain propositions, or from some a priori intuition. These sorts of things are immediately justifying grounds for your belief in p. We have to proceed carefully here. To say that certain experiences are grounds for your belief does not mean that your belief is based on further beliefs about those experiences. Rather, on the views I'm envisaging, merely having those experiences gives you immediate justi®cation for believing certain thingsÐ e.g. for believing that there is a table. When that's so, you needn't base your table-beliefs on any beliefs about your experiences. 20 However, we still need to distinguish between subjects who base their table-beliefs on the immediate justi®cation their experiences aord them, and subjects who, despite having that experiential justi®cation, none the less base their table-beliefs on other evidence (e.g. the stories their grandmother told them about tables). That is why we need the notion of basing a belief on an immediately justifying ground. Philosophers who deny that any beliefs are immediately justi®ed will of course deny that a belief can be justi®ed by virtue of being based on an immediately justifying ground. Even when we count things like experiences as a kind of ground, it is still controversial whether justi®ed beliefs are always based on some ground. For instance, it's unclear whether self-evident beliefs and some types of memorial belief are based on any grounds (see Plantinga [1993b] , pp. 187.). But let's restrict our attention to beliefs that are based on grounds. We can ask several questions about the access we have to those grounds: Must a ground be something to whose presence one has the`special access' which is operative in the internalism/externalism debate? Must one also have special access to whether the ground is an adequate one, that is, to whether it's possible to justi®ably base a belief on that ground? Endorsing the weaker access requirementÐnamely, that grounds have to be things to whose presence one has special accessÐdoes not by itself commit one to Simple Internalism. For it could be that one tells an externalist story about what makes the ground adequate. 21 Alternatively, one could tell a Simple Internalist story about why a given ground is adequate, but refrain from claiming that all subjects will be in a position to know that the ground is adequate. That would be Simple Internalism without Access Internalism. If one endorsed the strongest access requirementÐnamely, that subjects must have special access both to the presence and to the adequacy of their groundsÐthen one would be a fulledged Access Internalist (at least, concerning beliefs which have grounds). 
A spectrum of views
With these distinctions in hand, we can sketch out a spectrum of internalist and externalist views. Of these views, (i), (iv), and (v) have been most prominent in the literature.
(ii) and (iii) have had fewer champions. These latter two positions are conceptually important, however, for if one overlooked them, one might take criticisms of the other positions to have more force than they actually do. For instance, arguments against (i) cannot by themselves compel one to accept (iv) or (v); nor can arguments for Simple Internalism by themselves compel one to accept (i). Now we understand the internalism/externalism debate a bit better, and appreciate the variety of forms it can take. Let's turn next to the question whether assumptions about the ethics of belief force us to take any particular position in the internalism/externalism debate.
The ethics of belief 4.1 What does it mean to say that justi®cation is`normative'?
It is often argued that the fact that justi®cation is a certain kind of normative notion has implications for the internalism/externalism debate. I want to examine this claim. To begin, we need to know what's meant by saying that justi®cation is`normative', or that epistemology is a`normative' discipline. Here we face the problem that there are dierent ways of being`normative', important to dierent epistemological debates. We need to separate out the ones that are relevant here.
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The ®rst debate about`normativity' concerns the question of how relevant empirical research is to epistemology. Some naturalists argue that epistemology should be conceived as an extension of descriptive psychology; their opponents argue that epistemology is more than merely a descriptive enterprise, and that the proper methodology for doing epistemology is an a priori one. Various intermediate views are possible.
The second debate about`normativity' in epistemology concerns the question whether epistemological recommendations are merely hypothetical, or whether they're somehow non-optional or categorical. Some philosophers argue that it's only insofar as you have an independent interest (perhaps a prudential interest) in having`epistemically rational ' beliefs, or A fourth debate about`normativity' concerns the connection between being justi®ed and following the norms or guidelines that epistemology issues. Is the notion of justi®cation supposed to play a role in guiding and regulating our beliefs? That is, ought we to say that a belief is justi®ed when and only when the belief is permitted or recommended by some proper belief-guiding recipe, which the agent adhered to in forming the belief? Or ought we to view the notion of justi®cation as merely playing a role in third-person evaluations of belief, e.g. when we're deciding what propositions some agent counts as knowing? It is controversial whether the notion of justi®cation should be thought of as a beliefguiding notion. 29 One's answer to that question will depend in part on how much choice or control one thinks we have over what we believe (see fn. 26). Some philosophers have argued that the question whether justi®cation is a beliefguiding notion profoundly aects the internalism/externalism debate. We will consider the extent to which it does aect that debate below. But we need a bit more conceptual apparatus before we can do that. So let's press on. The ®fth and last debate about`normativity' in epistemology concerns the connection between justi®cation and the notions of epistemic praise and blame. Some philosophers believe that justi®cation should be understood in terms of epistemic blamelessness and epistemic responsibility. They say that whether one is justi®ed depends on how well one has met one's epistemic obligations, whether one is`doing the best one can' as a believer, or at least the best that can reasonably be expected of one, and so on. In the literature, these are called deontological conceptions of justi®cation, because of the primacy they usually attach to meeting one's epistemic obligations. We might also speak of praise-and-blame conceptions of justi®cation, or responsibilist conceptions of justi®cation, if we wanted to emphasize dierent elements. These views are all closely related to each other.
30
Philosophers who oppose those views acknowledge that`justi®cation' is an evaluative notion, a term of praise or criticism; but they deny that there is a tight connection between one's justi®catory status and how well one has met one's obligations, whether one merits praise and blame, and so on. Some of these opponents deny that we have any epistemic obligations. Others agree that we have epistemic obligationsÐand that we can assign a kind of epistemic praise and Highlights of Recent Epistemology 111 29 Goldman is an example of someone who construes justi®cation as a merely evaluative notion, not a belief-guiding one. (Goldman does sometimes discuss regulative questions, though: see [1978] , [1980] . Note that the`rules' he talks about in [1986] are not meant to constitute a beliefguiding recipe. Goldman emphasizes this on pp. 25±26 and 59.) 30 For discussions of the conceptual connections between justi®cation, epistemic obligation, and epistemic praise and blame, see: Goldman ([1980] , esp. Section V, [1988] ); Plantinga ([1988 , Ch. 1); ); Alston ([1989] , Essays 4, 5, and 8); Moser ([1989] , Section 1.3); Fumerton ([1995] , Ch. 1); and Haack ([1997] ). Some philosophers who think of justi®cation in deontological terms are: Ginet ([1975] , Ch. 3); Chisholm ([1977] , Ch. 1, Section 5, [1982] ); ); BonJour ([1985] , Ch. 1); and ). See the start of Goldman ([1999] ) on the connection between deontologism and the belief-guiding conception of justi®cation described above.
In discussions of deontological conceptions of justi®cation, it's common to distinguish between objective obligations and subjective obligations, and to tie blamelessness to conformity to one's subjective obligations. See Goldman ([1980] , pp. 36., [1986] , pp. 73.); , Essay 4 pp. 86.); , pp. 15.); and Pollock and Cruz ([1999] , pp. 140.) for this distinction.
blame by reference to themÐbut they deny that one's justi®catory status is always a function of the epistemic praise or blame one merits. On such views, the question whether one's belief is genuinely justi®ed is not settled by the fact that one is blameless in holding the belief. As they see it, there is a one kind of epistemic standing, which involves meeting all of one's epistemic obligations and proceeding in a responsible and blame-free manner; and there is another kind of epistemic standing, having a genuinely justi®ed belief; and the ®rst does not suce for the second. (We will discuss such views further below.)
In what follows, we will focus on whether justi®cation is`normative' in the ways operative in the fourth and ®fth debates, and how one's views about that aect the internalism/externalism debate.
Justi®cation, warrant, and epistemic blamelessness
These days, unfortunately, the terminological situation with respect tò justi®cation' is rather messy. A bit of stipulation will help.
If you believe that Bing is a male canary, and that 9 out of 10 male canaries can sing, and you have no other relevant evidence, then regardless of what you're inclined to believe on the basis of that evidence, there's an intuitive sense in which your evidence supports the conclusion that Bing can sing. Similarly, if you have a visual experience as of something yellow, and no countervailing evidence, what your evidence supports is the belief that there is something yellow in front of you. Let's call a belief that is supported in this way a justi®catorily supported belief. For now, let's leave it an open question whether this support relation is internalist or not; and let's also leave it open whether this support relation should be understood in deontological terms.
I ®nd it most natural to use the term`justi®cation' to refer to the support relation just articulated, however that relation ultimately gets to be analyzed. 31 However, as we'll see, some philosophers use the term`justi®cation' in a more restrictive way.
Following Plantinga, we can reserve the term`warrant' for a second notion, the notion of what has to be added to true belief to yield knowledge.
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It is most natural to think that warranted beliefs are beliefs for which one has justi®catory support, which are appropriately based, and which have some extra features necessary to handle the Gettier problem. But there is much disagreement about this. Some philosophers deny that warrant can be analyzed into justi®catory support plus some extra features. 33 And some philosophers believe that it's possible to know things for which one has no justi®catory support (see e.g. , Essay 7); if they're right, it follows that one can sometimes have warranted beliefs for which one has no justi®catory support. As I said above, not every philosopher acknowledges the existence of epistemic obligations. But as I also pointed out, even if one does acknowledge the existence of such obligations, it's a further question what the relationship is between meeting one's epistemic obligations and having a justi®catorily supported belief. So let's stipulate that talk of`epistemic blamelessness' is to concern how well one meets one's epistemic obligations, behaves in an epistemically responsible manner, and so on. Our stipulation will leave it open whether being justi®ed and being epistemically blameless always go hand-inhand. It needs argument to show that there is any close connection between these properties. Deontologists think such an argument can be given; and hence that being epistemically blameless suces for being justi®ed. We'll look at some reasons for disagreeing in a moment. But however that debate turns out, we can all agree that there is a legitimate and useful notion of epistemic blamelessness.
As I said, some philosophers deny that we have any real epistemic obligations. Hence they will not think that the notions of epistemic praise and blame I'm describing have any application. They might hold this view because they think we lack the kind of voluntary control over our beliefs that the notions of praise and blame demand (see fn. 26, above). My point is just that one can think there is a legitimate and useful notion of epistemic blamelessness without thereby committing oneself to a deontological conception of justi®cation.
For example, Montmarquet describes a notion of`justi®cation' that has close ties to epistemic praise and blame, but he wants this notion of justi®cation to ground our ascriptions of moral praise and blame for actions, not to play any important role in the theory of knowledge (see [1993] , esp. Ch. 6). In my terminology, Montmarquet is giving an account of epistemic blamelessness, and not taking a stand on what the relation is between justi®cation and blamelessness.
Later in his career, Chisholm also advocated the view that we have epistemic obligations, but the notion of justi®cation should not be explicated in terms of them. 34 Plantinga reserves the term`justi®cation' for the notion I'm calling epistemic blamelessness'; and Alston is tempted to do the same. 35 They claim that the etymology of`justi®cation' supports understanding it in this deontological way. I think it's unclear what the etymology supports; but in any case, in natural languages usage tends not to be a slave to etymology. And given the current usage of the term`justi®cation' among epistemologists, it seems to me better to use the term`justi®cation' for our ®rst notion, the relation of justi®catory support whose nature is being debated. Many past and some present-day epistemologists believe that justi®cation should be explicated in deontological terms. But we shouldn't build it into our de®nition of what we mean by`justi®cation' that this is so.
How should one's ethics of belief aect one's views about the internalism/externalism debate?
Now we are ®nally in a position to explore the connections between the ethics of belief and the internalism/externalism debate. These connections have been the subject of much recent discussion.
There are good reasons for thinking that justi®cation and epistemic blamelessness can come apart. Doing all that can be reasonably be expected of you, epistemically, is compatible with holding beliefs that have little or no genuine support. Imagine a hapless subject who is taught bad epistemic standards. For instance, suppose he makes mistakes when engaging in tricky statistical reasoning. Let's say the standards he's been taught fail to distinguish between the likelihood that a test will yield a false negative and the likelihood that the test will yield a false positive. Our hapless subject does his best to apply these standards, but unfortunately he is not intellectually capable of discerning their defects. Furthermore, he has lost all memory of his childhood and so doesn't recall how it was he ®rst acquired these standards. Cases of this sort naturally prompt two judgments. First, the subject's beliefs are epistemically defective in some important way. But second, the subject cannot be held culpable for those defects. You can say`The hapless subject ought to believe the things that his evidence really supports', but this`ought' doesn't seem to express any epistemic obligation. Our subject is doing the best he can, and the best that can reasonably be demanded of him. That seems a good reason to say he's violating no epistemic obligations. 36 Yet the beliefs he forms on the basis of statistical reasoning will be seriously defective; and for that reason it's natural to regard those beliefs as unjusti®ed. Hence it appears that a subject can sometimes be blameless for holding unjusti®ed beliefs.
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I myself think that justi®cation and epistemic blamelessness do come apart in this way, and that this militates against any deontological conception of justi®cation. But for the sake of argument, let's suppose that the line of reasoning I sketched can be resisted, and that the deontologist is right to forge a strong connection between justi®cation and epistemic blamelessness. What then would follow? One often sees it claimed that deontologism and internalism go hand-in-hand. However, there are some dissenting voices about this.
Let's ®rst consider whether viewing justi®cation as a kind of belief-guiding notion, or viewing it in deontological terms, commits one to internalism.
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Highlights of Recent Epistemology 115 36 Feldman ; , [2000] ) and Wolterstor ([1997] ) employ a very thin notion of`obligation', which merely requires some epistemic`ought' -claim to be true of a subject. This thin notion is insensitive to issues about what can reasonably be demanded of a subject, and whether the subject could have done otherwise than he did. I think this notion is too thin to capture our concept of a genuine obligation. (See Goggan's [1991] useful contrast between`purely valuative' norms and`deontic' norms. Only the second kind of norm corresponds to a genuine kind of epistemic obligation.) In any case, regardless of whether we regard this thin notion as genuine kind of obligation, it should be clear that there is no direct route from what one is`obliged' to do in that sense to what praise and blame one merits. When we talk of epistemic praise and blame, I assume we're talking about a kind of genuine culpability on the part of the subject, and not merely complimenting or criticizing the subject's beliefs. Praise and blame in this sense are sensitive to what can reasonably be demanded of one, and whether one could have done otherwise. In ([2000] ), Feldman acknowledges that the notion of`obligation' he's employing may come apart from assessments of praise and blame. 37 , Essay 4); Goldman ([1988] ); and Feldman and Conee ([forthcoming] ) all defend the claim that being epistemically blameless does not suce for being justi®ed. (Goldman calls blameless beliefs`weakly justi®ed', and calls genuinely justi®ed beliefs`strongly justi®ed'.) Alston and Goldman believe that the notion of being genuinely justi®ed, which goes beyond mere blamelessness, should be analyzed in externalist terms. However, I take that to be a further question. For a nice critical summary of Goldman's views on this topic, see Riggs ([1997] ). Plantinga ([1988 , Chs 1±2) argues that epistemic blamelessness doesn't suce for warranted belief; but many of the cases he discusses also show that being epistemically blameless doesn't suce for having what I'm calling a genuinely justi®ed belief. (Be careful: Plantinga uses the term`justi®ed' dierently than me; he uses it as a synonym for`epistemically blameless'.)
In the text, I presented an argument that one can have unjusti®ed beliefs that are epistemically blameless. Another question is whether it's possible to have blameworthy beliefs that are none the less justi®ed. That is a more delicate question. 38 , Ch. 1) argues that it would commit one to internalism. Alston ([1989] , Essay 8) discusses arguments from deontologism to dierent internalist theses. See also Greco ([1990] ). Pollock and Cruz ([1999] , Ch. 5) argue from a regulative or`procedural' conception of justi®cation to a kind of`internalism'. However, their de®nition of`internal state' (see pp. 132± 33) is dierent from the more standard one being used here; as a result, we do not mean the same thing by`internalism'. Also, I'm not convinced that their understanding of what it is for behavior to be`regulated by a norm' corresponds to the subject's genuinely following, or being guided by a norm. They seem to be more concerned with the underlying mechanisms that causally control a subject's behavior.
Let's assume that the relevant belief-guiding recipes or norms or obligations are of the form:`In circumstances C, believe p'. The question then arises whether C has to be the kind of circumstance to which the subject has thè special access' that is operative in the internalism/externalism debate. For instance, must the subject always be able to tell whether C obtains by re¯ection alone? Deontologists often argue in the following way:
If a belief-guiding recipe is to be usable in deciding what to believe, then the circumstances C it refers to must be circumstances such that the subject can tell whether they obtain, when he's following the recipe. In particular, they must be such that the subject can tell by re¯ection alone whether they obtain.
However, Goldman argues that this last claim is gratuitous. Perhaps the subject needs to be able to tell whether C obtains, if he's to follow the recipe, but Goldman denies that he has to be able to tell whether C obtains by re¯ection alone (see Goldman [1980] , esp. Section IX, [1999] ; Jacobson [1997] ). So the extent to which we have`special access' to C is a debated question.
Another question that arises is whether the fact that a given belief-guiding recipe is correct will be an internally determined matter, or a matter that one can ascertain by re¯ection alone. These issues are also controversial. For instance, Goldman at one point defended a reliabilist story about what makes belief-guiding recipes correct (again, see Goldman [1980] and Jacobson [1997] ).
Finally, Kornblith ([1982] ) argues that thinking that justi®cation is to be explained in terms of epistemological responsibility does not commit us to any form of Access Internalism.
So there does not seem to me to be any straightforward, uncontroversial route from a deontological or belief-guiding conception of justi®cation to any of the internalist views we described earlier.
Let's instead consider whether there are any interesting entailments in the opposite direction. Plantinga argues that internalism is well motivated only when one is working with a deontological conception of justi®cation ([1993a] , esp. Chs 1 and 3). Is that right?
It is true that some prominent rationales for internalism do employ deontological conceptions of justi®cation. For instance, arguments from thought-experiments involving brains in vats often include remarks like this:
There's no way for the brain to discover his plight; so he can't be blamed for forming the beliefs he does. He forms the same beliefs anyone else would form on the basis of that evidence. So even though many of his beliefs are false, he is at least justi®ed in having those beliefs.
Here it's being assumed that being epistemic blameless is sucient for being justi®ed.
But while arguments for internalism often do employ deontological conceptions of justi®cation, I am not persuaded that they have to. For instance, Cohen ([1984] ) argues for internalism by appeal to thought experiments involving brains in vats, and his arguments never appeal in any essential way to deontological assumptions. Many philosophers share Cohen's intuition that it's possible for a brain in a vat, if he conducts his aairs properly, to have many justi®ed (albeit false) beliefs about his environment. AndÐat least in my caseÐthis intuition survives the recognition that being epistemically blameless does not suce for being justi®ed. It doesn't merely seem to be the case that the brain in a vat can form beliefs in a way that is epistemically blameless. It also seems to be the case that he can form beliefs in a way that is epistemically proper, and that the beliefs he so forms would be fully justi®edÐdespite the fact that they're reliably false.
To illustrate this, consider three brains in a vat. The ®rst brain is epistemically quite reckless. He believes whatever he feels like believing, so long as he doesn't have incontrovertible evidence that it's false. The second brain is like the hapless subject we considered above. He's doing the best he can, epistemically, and the best that can be reasonably expected of him. He's very scrupulous and careful in following the epistemic standards he picked up as a child. Unfortunately, these epistemic standards are defective in a way he's not capable of recognizing. (Perhaps, as before, they fail to distinguish false negatives from false positives.) The third brain carefully follows the same epistemic standards we follow.
It seems natural to say that, although there's a sense in which the second and third brains are both epistemically blameless, only the third is conducting his epistemic aairs properly, and so only he is justi®ed in his beliefs. This indicates that there's a kind of positive epistemic status which goes beyond mere epistemic blamelessness, but which one can possess even if one's beliefs are reliably false, as the brains' beliefs are. Such considerations incline me to an internalist, non-deontological account of justi®cation. 39 Now, not every philosopher shares these intuitions about brains in vats. So by themselves they are not likely to settle the debate about internalism. Other arguments are needed to do that. But these intuitions about brains in vats do cast doubt on the claim that it would only be possible to motivate or defend internalism by appealing to deontological assumptions. I have so far seen no convincing argument for that claim. So there do not seem to me to be any clear entailments from internalism to a deontological conception of justi®cation. In my own view, then, it remains to be seen whether there is any tight connection between the ethics of belief and the internalism/externalism debate. I certainly have not shown that there could be no such connection. But I hope that the present discussion and the papers I've pointed to make it clear that this question is really less settled than it sometimes appears.
